A l’occasion de CSAW Europe, le LCIS et Grenoble INP Esisar vous invitent à une journée de conférences le 9 Novembre prochain dans les locaux de Grenoble INP Esisar à Valence.
La matinée, organisée avec le GT sécurité des systèmes matériels, commun aux GDR Sécurité Informatique et SOC2, sera dédiée à l’utilisation des Fonctions Physiques non Clonables pour la sécurité des systèmes.
L’après-midi sera elle dédiée aux 10 finalistes du concours Applied Research qui rejoueront les présentations de leur travaux publiés dans l’année dans des conférences de haut rang. Cette session devrait permettre au public d’avoir ainsi un beau panorama des activités de recherche de pointe en Europe dans différents domaines de la cybersécurité.
Vous trouverez ci-dessous le programme complet de la journée.
L’inscription à cette journée est gratuite et se fait via le lien suivant : https://framaforms.org/seminaire-csaw-europe-2023-1696229009
Pour toute information complémentaire, n’hésitez pas à nous contacter à csaw.europe@esisar.grenoble-inp.fr
CSAW Europe se tiendra du 9 au 10 novembre prochain à Valence dans les locaux de Grenoble INP Esisar, avec des compétitions et animations à destination de tous les étudiants du lycée au doctorat ( https://www.csaw.io/europe https://esisar.grenoble-inp.fr/fr/l-ecole/csaw. Les finales des différentes compétitions auront lieu le vendredi 10 novembre.
PUF-Enabled System Security (9:30 – 12:30)
talks details are given at the end of this page
Applied Research Presentations (14:00-17:30)
References :
o Fioraldi, Andrea, et al. “LibAFL: A framework to build modular and reusable fuzzers.” Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2022.
o Thoma, Jan Philipp, et al. “{ClepsydraCache}–Preventing Cache Attacks with {Time-Based} Evictions.” 32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23). 2023
o Khodayari, S., & Pellegrino, G. (2023, May). It’s (DOM) Clobbering Time: Attack Techniques, Prevalence, and Defenses. In 44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
o Ladisa, Piergiorgio, et al. “Sok: Taxonomy of attacks on open-source software supply chains.” 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2023.
o Gerlach, Lukas, et al. “A Security RISC: Microarchitectural Attacks on Hardware RISC-V CPUs.” 44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 2023.
o Cloosters, Tobias, et al. “RiscyROP: Automated Return-Oriented Programming Attacks on RISC-V and ARM64.” Proceedings of the 25th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses. 2022.
o Abbadini, M., Facchinetti, D., Oldani, G., Rossi, M., & Paraboschi, S. (2023). NatiSand: Native Code Sandboxing for JavaScript Runtimes. IEEE RAID 2023
o Shcherbakov, Mikhail, Musard Balliu, and Cristian-Alexandru Staicu. “Silent spring: Prototype pollution leads to remote code execution in Node. js.” USENIX Security Symposium 2023. 2023.
o Purnal, Antoon, et al. “ShowTime: Amplifying Arbitrary CPU Timing Side Channels.” ACM SIGSAC Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS). 2023.
Si, Wai Man, et al. “Why so toxic? measuring and triggering toxic behavior in open-domain chatbots.” Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2022.
o Methodologies for verification and quality assessment of Physical Unclonable Functions: Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) leverage process variability to generate unique signatures in electronic devices. PUFs can generate secrets “on-the-fly” and do not require non-volatile memory to store them, which makes them a good candidate to conventional security mechanism. However, PUFs can be influenced by external factors and can present biasing towards certain stimuli, which can be exploited by external attackers. That is why PUFs are normally evaluated through a common set of metrics such as uniformity, bitaliasing, uniqueness and reliability. PUFs also need to be tested in a great number of devices over a large set of operating conditions, since the underlying physics and mechanisms of PUFs makes them difficult to study and mitigate potential vulnerabilities and attacks. Yet, this methodology is not properly standardised which makes the process of comparing different PUF design limited, time-consuming and expensive. Overall, the quality metrics for PUFs are still evolving, and there is ongoing research to address these challenges and develop more robust and reliable PUFs. The objective of this presentation is twofold: first provide an introduction to the evaluation and quality assessment of Physical Unclonable Functions and statistical pitfalls to beware. Secondly, demonstrate some PUF oriented utilities, primarily a platform for the automatic collection of data for SRAM based PUFs and a framework focused on exploration and verification of PUF responses.
o PHASEPUF: PHotonic Augmented SEcurity via Physical Unclonable Functions: Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are hardware-based security primitives that can be used as fingerprints for detecting counterfeit hardware, to provide secure authentication services or yet as cryptographic keys for encryption protocols, avoiding local storage of secret keys into digital memory. These features can be achieved thanks to their complex and highly unpredictable responses, strongly dependent on fabrication tolerances. However, in order to be considered as serious alternatives to more standard digital technologies, they need to present several properties such as robustness, CMOS-compatibility, and reliability. In this talk novel designs based on photonic integrated technologies will be showcased within the framework of the ANR project PHASEPUF and their advantages as well as their limitations will be highlighted with respect to current competing technologies.
o Dynamic SRAM PUF, a use case for PUF in consumer electronics:
This talk is the journey story to introduce PUF authentication in consumer electronics. In 2011 Thomas Fischl designed open hardware and software for USBASP token, i.e. USB in-circuit programmer for AVR microcontrollers, widely used by the Arduino IDE. These devices may act as the root of trust for microcontroller programming. Many clones are manufactured at very low prices. Using commercial tokens, the idea was to prove both hardware and software authenticity in order to avoid supply chain attacks or counterfeit boards. USBASP tokens work with the Atmega8 processor, and they can program each other. The first step was to design software (with Arduino IDE) to dump the SRAM, to download it, and to collect SRAM content through a serial link. For this purpose we designed “a PUF extractor” based on an Arduino chip”. Thereafter we defined graphic tools and enrollment methods for SRAM PUF. Thanks to this process we are able to perform static authentication. In 2017 Abdelrahman T. Elshafiey & Al, observed that, due to capacitance dissymmetry, the power supply ramp time modifies SRAM PUF. This introduces the concept of flipping bits, which, depending on ramp time, are either always seen at one or zero. Because this effect occurs at very low voltage, it enables the definition of dynamic SRAM PUF, which can’t be guessed by malicious software. This effect enables dynamic authentication. By using an attestation algorithm that hashes the content of microcontroller memories (including part of SRAM) according to a permutation, we produce a result that proves the firmware integrity, but also the existence of flipping bits. Finally this process can be applied to many microcontrollers.
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